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DO WARRANTLESS BREATHALYZER TESTS
VIOLATE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT?
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* J.D. University of Chicago, 2005; Ph.D. The Catholic University of America,
1995. The author has clerked for the Hon. Robert Eastaugh, Alaska Supreme Court,
and the Hon. Consuelo Callahan, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourteenth Amendment mandates the same
standards on the states, although strictly speaking the Fourth Amendment itself applies only to the federal government; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
2. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
3. Missouri v. McNeely, No. 11–1425 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2013).
4. Id. at 8–9 (explaining that further delay securing a search warrant would compromise evidence).
5. 489 U.S. 602, 617–18 (1989) (“Subjecting a person to a breathalyzer test . . .
implicates similar concerns about bodily integrity and, like the blood-alcohol test . . .
should also be deemed a search.”) (internal citations omitted).
6. See, e.g., State v. Blank, 90 P.3d 156, 164 (Alaska 2004) (“Many courts have
implicitly or explicitly held that the dissipation of alcohol always creates sufficient
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The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”1 The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that “searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”2 On April 17, 2013, in Missouri v.
McNeely,3 the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that the exigent circumstances exception to the search warrant requirement requires the government to prove that there was no time to obtain a search warrant before
evidence seized in a warrantless search is admissible at trial.4 Although
the search in McNeely involved a search and seizure of a defendant’s
blood, the rule applies to other searches, such as searches of a defendant’s breath in the form of breathalyzer tests. Indeed, in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association,5 the Supreme Court explicitly held
that breathalyzer tests are searches subject to the same Fourth Amendment limitations as blood tests. Prior to McNeely, courts had generally
held that such breath test searches fell under the exigent circumstances
exception to the warrant requirement.6 Although breath testing is less in-
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trusive than blood testing, this fact does not negate the state’s obligation
to seek a warrant when it can do so without jeopardizing the
investigation.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Blood Testing and Search Warrants
1. Background of McNeely
Before looking at McNeely, there are two important Supreme Court
cases that deal with blood testing and form the background of McNeely.
The most important precedent is Schmerber v. California,7 which the McNeely Court discussed at some length. For almost fifty years, Schmerber
was the primary precedent involving blood testing; however, during the
past few decades it has given rise to significantly different interpretations
in the lower courts. These deviations are not very surprising as the Court
decided Schmerber while Fourth Amendment law was very much in flux,
before the groundbreaking decisions in Katz v. United States or Terry v.
Ohio.8 It was only five years earlier, in Mapp v. Ohio,9 that the Supreme
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the states from
conducting unreasonable searches and seizures, thus in effect applying
the Fourth Amendment to the states. Moreover, Schmerber did not provide any clear rules to apply in such cases and merely used an ad hoc,
totality of the circumstances test. Additionally, the Court cautioned that
its holding was limited to the specific facts of that case. Thus, in recent
cases, courts have struggled to apply the 1966 decision.
The facts in Schmerber are fairly simple; the legal issues are more
complicated. Mr. Schmerber was in an automobile accident and taken to

02/06/2014 10:11:19
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exigency to dispense with the warrant requirement, although at least one court has
held that the state must prove exigency on a case-by-case basis.”) (footnotes removed). A few courts held that breath testing is permitted under a different exception
to the warrant requirements, namely the “search incident to arrest” exception. See,
e.g., Burnett v. Municipality of Anchorage, 806 F.2d 1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1986). But
see State v. McNeely, 358 S.W.3d 65, 72 n.5 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (“To the extent that
[prior precedents] interpret Schmerber to allow a nonconsensual warrantless blood
draw incident to arrest in DWI cases without other exigent circumstances, they are no
longer to be followed.”).
7. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
8. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), first
articulated the “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard, while Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968), created the now ubiquitous “Terry stop” exception to warrant
requirement.
9. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
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the hospital.10 Police arrested him and ordered him not to resist while
medical personnel extracted a blood sample.11 The government later used
the blood sample to convict Mr. Schmerber of drunk driving.12 These facts
raised numerous constitutional issues, but Schmerber is chiefly famous for
its holding on the Fourth Amendment.
The first issue, which the court disposed of quite easily, was that a
forced blood draw was definitely a “search” for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment.13 The Court next turned to whether the blood search was an
unreasonable search.14 The Court examined a variety of earlier cases and
discussed the search incident to arrest exception, noting that valid
searches incident to arrest do not include searches beyond the body’s surface.15 The Court then explained that the officer may have believed that
he was facing an emergency situation where any delay threatened to destroy evidence.16 Additionally, the Court considered the fact that “the
percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system” and concluded that the threatened “destruction of evidence” made the search
“appropriate incident to petitioner’s arrest.”17 Later precedents would establish that the burden was on the prosecution to prove that exigent circumstances existed.18 The Court in Schmerber, however, held that the
search was justified based on two deferential factors: the lawfulness of the
arrest and an emergency that did not permit the officer the time to obtain
a warrant.19
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10. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758–59.
11. Id. at 761.
12. Id. at 759.
13. Id. at 767 (“Such testing procedures plainly constitute searches of ‘persons’
. . . .”).
14. Id. at 770–71.
15. Id. at 769.
16. Id. at 770–72.
17. Id. at 770–71 (internal citation omitted). As the Missouri Supreme Court explained, “[a]lthough Schmerber couched its limited exception to the warrant requirement in terms of a search incident to arrest, it has since been read as an application of
the exigent circumstances exception. . . .” State v. McNeely, 358 S.W.3d 65, 70 (Mo.
2012) (en banc) (citing United States v. Berry, 866 F.2d 887, 891 (6th Cir. 1989)).
18. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (“[T]here must
be a showing by those who seek exemption . . . that the exigencies of the situation
made that course imperative.” (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456
(1948) (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted))).
19. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771–72.
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The Court concluded that the search was reasonable overall.20 Additionally, the Court emphasized the “commonplace” nature of the blood
test:
[W]e are satisfied that the test chosen to measure petitioner’s
blood-alcohol level was a reasonable one. Extraction of blood
samples for testing is a highly effective means of determining the
degree to which a person is under the influence of alcohol. Such
tests are a commonplace in these days of periodic physical examinations . . . the quantity of blood extracted is minimal, and . . . the
procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain.21
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20. Id. at 771.
21. Id. (internal citation omitted).
22. Id. at 772.
23. See id.
24. State v. Bohling, 494 N.W.2d 399, 402 (Wis. 1993); see also Dale v. State, 209
P.3d 1038, 1042 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009); State v. Machuca, 227 P.3d 729, 736 (Or.
2010) (en banc); State v. Netland, 762 N.W.2d 202, 212–13 (Minn. 2009); State v.
Shriner, 751 N.W.2d 538, 545 (Minn. 2008).
25. See generally State v. Rodriguez, 156 P.3d 771, 772 (Utah 2007) (explaining
dissipation of alcohol in blood without more evidence does not create exigent circumstance); State v. Johnson, 744 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Iowa 2008) (noting that some courts
reject “evanescence of blood-alcohol” as sufficient to constitute “exigent circum-
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Summarizing its holding, the Court described blood tests as minor intrusions: “That we today told that the Constitution does not forbid the
States’ minor intrusions into an individual’s body under stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions.”22
The Schmerber decision did not provide rules to guide courts in
Fourth Amendment cases. Instead, Schmerber seems to be based on the
rather subjective feelings of the justices that blood draws were “minor
intrusions.”23 Despite the decision’s explicit caution that the holding does
not apply “under other conditions,” lower courts relied on its holding for
decades in deciding the constitutionality of blood and breath testing.
Generally, lower courts applying Schmerber interpret it as permitting
warrantless blood draws whenever the state needs to confirm the presence of alcohol in a suspect’s blood. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court
wrote: “A logical analysis of the Schmerber decision indicates that the
exigency of the situation presented was caused solely by the fact that the
amount of alcohol in a person’s blood stream diminishes over time.”24 A
few lower courts, however, require a specific showing that police had no
time to obtain a search warrant before a blood draw.25
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stance by itself”); State v. D’Andrea, No. 95890, 2006 WL 3411101, at *4 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 2006).
26. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 610–11 (1989) (suspended employees were nonetheless entitled to a hearing “concerning their refusal to
take the test.”).
27. Id. at 617.
28. Id. at 616–17 (internal citations omitted); see also Burnett v. Municipality of
Anchorage, 806 F.2d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir. 1986) (“It is not disputed that the administration of a breath test is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
. . .”); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1141 (3d Cir. 1986) (parties agreed daily
breathalyzer amounted to search or seizure); 1 Wayne R. LaFave, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.6(b) (2d ed. 1987).
29. 489 U.S. at 619 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
30. Id. at 619.
31. Id.
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Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association is the second major precedent that is an important backdrop to McNeely, even though
McNeely only made two passing references to Skinner. Skinner involved a
facial challenge to a federal regulation that required railroad employees
to undergo blood, breath, or urine testing for alcohol or drugs. The regulations provided that the railroad must suspend employees from work for
nine months if they refused.26
Most importantly for our purposes, the Court held that blood,
breath, and urine tests were “searches.”27 The Court cited Schmerber for
the principle that a blood test was a search and then explained: “[A]
breathalyzer test . . . like the blood-alcohol test we considered in Schmerber, should also be deemed a search.”28 We will return to the issue of
breathalyzer tests later in this article, but Skinner quite explicitly held
that breathalyzer tests are searches.
The Court then addressed the crux of the matter: whether the search
violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court explained that “a search or
seizure in such a case is not reasonable unless it is accomplished pursuant
to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause. We have recognized
exceptions to this rule. . . .”29 Thus in Skinner, there is an immediate difference from the way that the Schmerber court decided the issue. In
Schmerber, the Court looked at all of the circumstances and made a judgment about overall reasonableness. In comparison, the Skinner Court
stated a clear rule: “Except in certain well-defined circumstances, a
search or seizure . . . is not reasonable unless it is accomplished pursuant
to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause.”30 The Court then decided if the government had established that a recognized exception applied.31 Additionally, Skinner’s statement that warrantless searches are
unreasonable mirrors the Court’s language in Katz. In Katz, the Court
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created the fundamental rule that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless the state can prove that the search falls within one of the
few specifically established exceptions.32 In recent years, the Court has
repeatedly affirmed this basic rule.33
Nonetheless, despite the Court’s repeated statements that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless they fall within a specific
exception, the Court has occasionally ignored the Katz rule and applied a
more generalized reasonableness test like the one the Court used in
Schmerber. For example, in Ohio v. Robinette,34 the Court explained: “We
have long held that the ‘touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.’ Reasonableness, in turn, is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances.”35 Yet again, in United States v.
Knights,36 the Court concluded that “the search of Knights was reasonable under our general Fourth Amendment approach of ‘examining the
totality of the circumstances.’”37
The Court does not give a reason why it applies one test rather than
the other.38 Justice Scalia noted in a 1991 concurring opinion that the
Court had “lurched back and forth between imposing a categorical warrant requirement and looking to reasonableness alone.”39 We will return
to this issue later, but for the moment I want to highlight this tension
because it is a potential issue in every Fourth Amendment case.40 We

02/06/2014 10:11:19
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32. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
33. Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 19–20 (1984) (“In a long line of cases,
this Court has stressed that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.’ ” (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357)).
34. 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
35. Id. at 39 (citation omitted).
36. 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
37. Id. (citation omitted). Most recently in Maryland v. King, No. 12–207, slip op.
at 10 (U.S. June 3, 2013), the Supreme Court applied a generalized reasonableness
test to DNA seizures of arrested suspects—again without any clear explanation of
why they used such a test in that case.
38. See, e.g., Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright Line Breaking Point: Embracing Justice
Scalia’s Call for the Supreme Court to Abandon an Unreasonable Approach to Fourth
Amendment Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 77 (2007).
39. California v. Avecedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
40. Some lower courts use a generalized reasonableness test in drug and alcohol
testing cases. For example, the Ninth Circuit, in ruling whether police could compel a
suspect to submit a urine sample, did not explicitly state what exception to the warrant requirement applied in the case but simply compared the case to Schmerber and
held: “We are persuaded that requiring an arrestee to submit to a urine test is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. It is a less intrusive search than the withdrawal of
blood from the human body.” United States v. Edmo, 140 F.3d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir.
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1998). Edmo did state (incorrectly) that Schmerber applied the search incident to arrest exception, and may have simply been assuming that the same exception applied
in Edmo’s case. In general, however, lower courts start with the per se rule that warrantless searches must fall within a recognized exception.
41. See, e.g., State v. Ravotto, 777 A.2d 301, 316 (N.J. 2001) (holding that blood
draw generally fell under exigent circumstances exception but was not reasonable
under the particular circumstances it was drawn).
42. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989).
43. Id. at 620 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
44. Id. at 620–21.
45. See id. at 624.
46. Id. at 623 (citation omitted).
47. Id.

33996-nmx_44-1 Sheet No. 53 Side A

should also note that many jurisdictions use the two tests as a two-part
test: the search must fall within an established exception and must be
reasonable overall.41
Returning to the Court’s decision in Skinner, the Court explained
that the blood and breath tests fell within the “special needs” exception
of the warrant requirement.42 The Court explained: “The Government’s
interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure safety
. . . presents ‘special needs’ beyond normal law enforcement that may
justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements.”43 A primary reason the Court upheld the search under the special
needs doctrine was that the doctrine was designed to prevent accidents,
not to obtain evidence for criminal prosecutions.44 After determining that
the special needs exception applied, the Court then held that the exigent
circumstances exception justified the search.45 The Court recognized “that
the Government’s interest in dispensing with the warrant requirement is
at its strongest when, as here, ‘the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely
to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search.’”46 The Court
agreed with the Federal Railroad Administration, recognizing that “alcohol and other drugs are eliminated from the bloodstream at a constant
rate, and blood and breath samples taken to measure whether these substances were in the bloodstream when a triggering event occurred must
be obtained as soon as possible.”47 The Court’s reference to the “exigent
circumstances” exception as an alternate basis for their holding suggests
that the need to test for drugs or alcohol “as soon as possible” gave the
government wide discretion to dispense with the search warrant requirement. Moreover, the Court continued to regard Schmerber as good law,
despite the obvious conflict between the way the Court decided Schmerber and the way the Court decided Skinner.
When the Skinner Court decided whether the exigent circumstances
exception applied to the blood, breath, and urine tests, the Court applied
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a very deferential balancing test, balancing the privacy interest against
the state’s need for evidence.48 The Court stated that because
“[o]rdinarily, an employee consents to significant restrictions in his freedom of movement where necessary for his employment,” the Court concluded that “additional interference with a railroad employee’s freedom
of movement that occurs in the time it takes to procure a blood, breath,
or urine sample for testing cannot, by itself, be said to infringe significant
privacy interests.”49 The Court quoted Winston v. Lee as stating that,
“[B]lood tests do not constitute an unduly extensive imposition on an
individual’s privacy and bodily integrity.”50 The Skinner court went on to
explain:
The breath tests . . . are even less intrusive than the blood tests
. . . . Breath tests do not require piercing the skin and may be
conducted safely outside a hospital environment and with a minimum of inconvenience or embarrassment. Further, breath tests reveal the level of alcohol in the employee’s bloodstream and
nothing more. Like the blood testing procedures . . . which can be
used only to ascertain the presence of alcohol or controlled substances in the bloodstream, breath tests reveal no other facts in
which the employee has a substantial privacy interest. In all the
circumstances, we cannot conclude that the administration of a
breath test implicates significant privacy concerns.51
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48. See id. at 624.
49. Id. at 625.
50. Id. (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762 (1985)).
51. Id. at 625–26 (citation omitted).
52. Id. at 628.
53. See id. at 642-643 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Although the importance of collecting blood and urine samples before drug or alcohol metabolites disappear justifies
waiving the warrant requirement for those two searches under the narrow “exigent
circumstances” exception . . . , no such exigency prevents railroad officials from securing a warrant before chemically testing the samples they obtain.”).
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Finally, the Court dictated that “[b]y contrast, the Government interest in testing without a showing of individualized suspicion is compelling.”52 This language indicates that the Skinner court addressed the
applicability of the exigent circumstances test by balancing the privacy
interests of the individuals against the government’s interest. The Court
did not give any per se rules about the exigent circumstances exception.
For example, the Court certainly did not hold that the government must
show on a case-by-case basis that there was no time to obtain a warrant.
In fact, the Court’s treatment suggested the opposite.53
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It should be recalled, however, that Skinner involved a facial challenge to the statute.54 There were no individual plaintiffs and no individual criminal defendants. Accordingly, the decision did not address what
would happen in the context of a criminal prosecution. The fact that Skinner did not involve a criminal prosecution is crucial because it explains
why lower courts continue to rely on Schmerber in the criminal context.
The fact that the two most important precedents involving blood and
breath testing were outdated and inconsistent gave ample reason for the
Supreme Court to revisit these issues once more in 2013.
III. ANALYSIS
A. McNeely and the Exigent Circumstances Exception
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54. Id. at 614.
55. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1556 (2013) (quoting Schmerber v.
United States, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966)).
56. Id. at 1557.
57. Id. at 1556.
58. Id. at 1557.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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The Supreme Court’s prior precedents permitted warrantless blood
tests on a fairly minimal showing of need. Accordingly, one might have
thought that, in McNeely, the Court would find a way to permit the state
to conduct warrantless searches in drunk driving cases.
Justice Sotomayor wrote the majority opinion, which only three
other justices joined in its entirety. Sections II(C) and III of Sotomayor’s
opinion did not receive majority support; however, eight justices concurred with the basic holding of the case: the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement only applies when there is no time to
obtain a search warrant before the destruction of important evidence.55
The trial court described McNeely as “unquestionably a routine
DWI case.”56 A police officer stopped McNeely at 2 a.m. because they
observed several signs he was drunk.57 Police arrested McNeely after he
refused to provide either a breath sample or a blood sample.58 Although
one officer later conceded that there was plenty of time for him to apply
for a search warrant, the officer did not do so.59 Instead, the police officer
took McNeely to the hospital where hospital personnel forcibly drew McNeely’s blood.60 The officer testified that, after reading an article in “Traffic Safety News,” he believed that no warrant was needed because
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61. State v. McNeely, 358 S.W.3d 65, 68 (Mo. 2012).
62. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013) (citation omitted).
63. Id.
64. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 223–24 (1973).
65. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
66. 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
67. Id. at 292.
68. The Court ultimately held that the search was permissible under the exigent
circumstances exception because the time needed to acquire a warrant would have
permitted the suspect to rub the blood from his hand. However, two justices dissented
arguing police could have arrested and restrained the suspect while they applied for a
warrant. Id. at 295.
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Missouri’s “implied consent law” permitted him to draw blood without a
warrant.61
In McNeely, the Court began its analysis by explaining the well-settled law that warrantless searches are presumptively unconstitutional:
“[A] warrantless search of the person is reasonable only if it falls within a
recognized exception.”62 Moreover, the Court reasoned that this principle
applied to McNeely because the case “involved a compelled physical intrusion beneath McNeely’s skin and into his veins to obtain a sample of
his blood for use as evidence in a criminal investigation.”63 This is a true
statement of precedent, but it would have been equally true had the
Court stated: “Our cases have held that a warrantless search of the person is reasonable only if it falls within a recognized exception and that
principle applies to all searches of the person no matter how minor.” The
Court has repeatedly held that fairly minor intrusions are searches subject to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. For example, the
Court upheld a search of a suspect’s coat pocket after police arrested him
for driving with a revoked license only after it found an exception to the
warrant requirement applied.64 Similarly, the Court has held that a purely
external pat down of a suspect for weapons when police believe the suspect is both armed and dangerous is a search that is only constitutional if
it falls within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.65 In
Cupp v. Murphy,66 the police scraped the blood from the suspect’s finger
and used it as evidence at trial.67 The Court again noted that this was a
search and unconstitutional unless the state could show that the search
fell within an exception to the warrant requirement.68 These cases indicate that the same legal principle—a warrantless search of the person is
reasonable only if it falls within a recognized exception to the warrant
requirement—applies regardless of whether the intrusion was minor.
Nevertheless, the Court in McNeely emphasized that drawing blood was a
particularly intrusive type of search: “Such an invasion of bodily integrity
implicates an individual’s ‘most personal and deep-rooted expectations of
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69. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013) (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470
U.S. 753, 760 (1985)).
70. See id. at 1565.
71. Id. at 1559 (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978)).
72. See infra section D(1).
73. This is one reason, in particular, why Fourth Amendment law is so complicated. Even when there are clear rules, there are exceptions to the rules, and there are
even exceptions to the exceptions.
74. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1556.
75. Id. at 1561.
76. Id. at 1562 (noting that “technological developments that enable police officers to secure warrants more quickly . . . are relevant to an assessment of exigency”).
77. Id. at 1563.
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privacy.’”69 It is unclear how the search’s level of intrusiveness affects the
analysis because, under the per se test, there is no balancing of interests—
a warrantless search (no matter how minor) is per se unreasonable unless
it falls within a recognized exception. This discussion about intrusiveness
suggests that a less intrusive search might have been constitutional; however this notion contradicts the per se rule that a warrantless search is
unreasonable unless it falls within an exception. The Court’s view that
blood draws are particularly intrusive is dictum that only confuses the
legal analysis.70
In any event, after stating the basic rule that a search must fall
within an established exception, the Court noted that there is a well-recognized exception when “there is (1) compelling need for official action
and (2) no time to secure a warrant.”71 With respect to the exigent circumstances exception, the rule has long been that the exception only applies when there is no time to obtain a warrant. Nonetheless, many courts
interpreting Schmerber have held as a matter of law that there is never
time to obtain a warrant for a blood alcohol test.72 Perhaps another view
is that alcohol absorption creates an exception to the rule that police
must seek a warrant if they have time.73 Indeed, the McNeely Court characterized the issue as “whether the natural metabolization of alcohol in
the bloodstream presents a per se exigency that justifies an exception to
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood
testing in all drunk-driving cases.”74 The Court held that “[i]n those
drunk-driving investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a
warrant before a blood sample can be drawn . . . the Fourth Amendment
mandates that they do so.”75
The Court was skeptical of the claim that there was never time to
obtain a warrant in blood draw cases.76 The prosecution’s argument was
that, with each passing minute, the human body metabolizes alcohol, reducing the blood alcohol level.77 Thus, the Court noted that: “the percent-
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Our cases establish that there is an exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. That exception applies when
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78. Id. at 1561.
79. Of course, testing is not quite that simple, and even blood tests have a margin
of error, but for the sake of argument let us assume the exact level of BAC can be
tested.
80. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1561 (noting that “an officer can take steps to secure a
warrant while the suspect is being transported to a medical facility”).
81. Id. at 1557.
82. State v. McNeely, 358 S.W.3d 65, 68 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
83. Id.
84. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1563.
85. Id. at 1569 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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age of alcohol in an individual’s blood typically decreases by
approximately 0.015 percent to 0.02 percent per hour once the alcohol
has been fully absorbed.”78 In other words, the blood alcohol content decreases by .001 every three to four minutes. Therefore, a person tested at
2:30 a.m. with a blood alcohol level of .080 might well test at 2:33 a.m.
with a blood alcohol level of .079.79 Thus, conceivably, a delay of as little
as three minutes could affect a conviction. Moreover, a police officer will
likely have no way of knowing how close the suspect was to the limit until
after the test.
While the Court acknowledged that a delay of a few minutes could
indeed harm the prosecution’s case, they discussed how it takes time to
transport a suspect to the hospital and arrange for a medical professional
to draw blood. Therefore, there was no reason to assume that the need to
get a warrant would necessarily delay the blood draw.80 In McNeely’s
case, for example, he was stopped at 2:08 a.m., and “the sample was secured at approximately 2:35,” some 27 minutes later.81 Although the Supreme Court did not emphasize this fact, the Missouri Supreme Court
noted that the officer who arrested McNeely had regularly obtained
search warrants to draw blood.82 Furthermore, the officer testified that
the only reason he had not obtained a warrant in McNeely’s case was his
belief that warrants were no longer necessary.83 The Court’s opinion further notes that, given the ability to obtain search warrants through telephonic testimony, police could often obtain search warrants while they
transported the suspect to the hospital.84 Hence, there would be no delay
in the blood testing.
Chief Justice Roberts wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.85 Justices Alito and Breyer joined his opinion. What is
most interesting is that Justices Roberts, Breyer, and Alito agreed with
the central holding of the majority. The Chief Justice wrote:
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there is a compelling need to prevent the imminent destruction of
important evidence, and there is no time to obtain a warrant. The
natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream constitutes not
only the imminent but ongoing destruction of critical evidence.
That would qualify as an exigent circumstance, except that there
may be time to secure a warrant before blood can be drawn. If
there is, an officer must seek a warrant.86
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86. Id.
87. Id. at 1572.
88. Id. at 1574.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1564–65.
91. Id. at 1558–59.
92. Id. at 1565–66 (“To the extent that the State and its amici contend that applying the traditional Fourth Amendment totality-of-the-circumstances analysis to deter-
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Most of the Chief Justice’s opinion is devoted to explaining in greater
detail how fast and easy it is to obtain warrants through electronic
means.87 The Chief Justice’s only disagreement with the majority was that
he believed that the majority answered the question presented but “offer[ed] no additional guidance, merely instructing courts and police officers to consider the totality of the circumstances.”88 Chief Justice
Roberts asserted that the majority could have provided “more meaningful guidance . . . about how to handle the typical [drunk-driving] cases.”89
Other than this disagreement, Justices Roberts, Breyer, and Alito agreed
with the majority’s main holding.
Finally, I want to look briefly at Section III of Justice Sotomayor’s
opinion. Section III of the opinion is interesting for three reasons. First,
the section discussed the argument that the privacy interest in breath testing is minimal and the state interest is strong, and the court should therefore balance these factors when formulating a rule about warrantless
blood testing.90 As noted above, in section IIA of the opinion, the Court
considered the intrusiveness of the search important.91 Nonetheless, black
letter rules dictated the outcome of the case. First, any warrantless search
is per se unconstitutional if it does not fall within an exception. Second,
an exigent circumstances exception is per se not allowable if officers had
time to seek a warrant. These two rules decided the case regardless of the
intrusiveness of the search or the state interest.
Yet, instead of simply stating that the black letter rules dictate the
case’s outcome, section III says the state failed to persuade the court that
the rules will affect the states’ ability to deter drunk driving and therefore
the state still would not prevail even if the court used a “totality-of-thecircumstances” test.92 Thus, this section simply muddies the legal waters.
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One might read section III to suggest that the ruling could be different if
the privacy interest was less important and the state interest more significant. Whether one thinks the Court went too far or not far enough, the
decision is open to the criticism that the ghoulish prospect of the state
sucking a person’s blood without a warrant influenced the decision too
much.
The second reason that section III is relevant to the issue of breath
testing was Justice Sotomayor’s reasons for thinking that the state interest
in blood testing was not that significant. Justice Sotomayor wrote:
States have a broad range of legal tools to enforce their drunkdriving laws and to secure BAC evidence without undertaking
warrantless nonconsensual blood draws. For example, all 50 States
have adopted implied consent laws that require motorists, as a
condition of operating a motor vehicle within the State, to consent
to BAC testing if they are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense. Such laws impose significant consequences when a motorist withdraws consent; typically the
motorist’s driver’s license is immediately suspended or revoked,
and most States allow the motorist’s refusal to take a BAC test to
be used as evidence against him in a subsequent criminal
prosecution.93
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mine whether an exigency justified a warrantless search will undermine the
governmental interest in preventing and prosecuting drunk-driving offenses, we are
not convinced.”).
93. Id. (citations omitted).
94. State v. McNeely, 358 S.W.3d 65, 68 (Mo. 2012) (en banc), aff’d, Missouri v.
McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013).
95. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1566 (noting penalties “when a motorist withdraws
consent”).
96. Compare McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1565–66 (holding that the State may not forcibly draw blood without showing exigent circumstances), with South Dakota v. Neville,
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One could read Justice Sotomayor’s reference to implied consent to mean
that states could justify forced blood draws under so-called “implied consent” statutes. This entire case resulted from the fact that the arresting
officer mistakenly thought that Missouri’s implied consent statute permitted him to draw blood without a warrant.94 Missouri did not argue that a
state statute could override the constitutional search requirements. Justice Sotomayor’s comment does not say that states could use their “implied consent” statutes to circumvent the warrant requirement. In fact,
she notes that motorists can “withdraw” their consent.95 Justice
Sotomayor’s point is that the state can encourage suspects to cooperate
by penalizing them either civilly or criminally.96
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Finally, section III is interesting for what it omits. Justice Sotomayor
suggested alternative ways that the state could try to enforce drunk-driving laws other than performing warrantless searches. She notably did not
include the option that states could conduct searches under a different
exception to the warrant requirement such as the search incident to arrest
exception.97 McNeely did not explicitly say that searches incident to arrest
were inapplicable, but it seemed to implicitly hold this. After all, McNeely never challenged the lawfulness of his arrest. Additionally, the McNeely Court noted that there were a variety of exceptions to the warrant
requirement and, yet, only considered the exigent circumstances exception.98 Thus, one can read McNeely as not permitting warrantless blood
testing under the search incident to arrest exception.
The McNeely decision has wide ranging and significant implications
for drunk driving prosecutions in the United States. In the next section I
want to turn to the primary focus of this article: since the Fourth Amendment requires search warrants (or a showing that there was no time to
obtain one) prior to the state requiring a blood test, does the Fourth
Amendment impose the same requirement for breath tests?
B. How Does McNeely Affect Whether Police Officers Must Obtain a
Warrant Before Conducting a Breathalyzer Test?
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459 U.S. 553, 559–60 (1983) (holding that the State could forcibly draw blood without
a warrant; after McNeely, Neville no longer seems to be good law).
97. See McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1566 (providing a more detailed discussion of the
scope of search incident to arrest).
98. See id. at 1565.
99. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 603 (1989); see also
Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013) (noting in passing that the Court had
previously described a breathalyzer test as a search, citing Skinner, and used this to
conclude that a swab of the mouth is also a search).
100. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1973).
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The first question to address is whether breathalyzer tests are
searches under the Fourth Amendment. As noted above, in Skinner, the
Court explicitly held that a breathalyzer test is a search.99 To be thorough,
however, I will examine recent case law since Skinner to see if there is
any argument that the Court has overturned or weakened this holding.
What constitutes a “search” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment
is not always clear. For example, the Court has held that forcing a suspect
to speak is not a search because the sound of one’s voice is not normally
concealed from the public, and hence no one has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the sound of one’s voice.100 Is one’s breath the same as
the sound of one’s voice? Like speech, the odor of a person’s breath
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533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Id. at 29.
Id.
See id. at 40.
Id. at 34 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
132 S.Ct. 945 (2012).
Id. at 948.
Id. at 949.
Id.
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
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seems to be open to public observation and arguably no one has an expectation of privacy in one’s exhalations.
A good case to illustrate this question is Kyllo v. United States.101
Kyllo involved thermal imaging of the suspect’s home.102 Thermal imaging
allowed the government to see what was going on inside the residence to
a limited extent. The main issue in Kyllo was whether this thermal imaging constituted a search.103 The answer was not obvious. In fact, the Court
held by only a five to four vote that it was a search.104 The Court reasoned
that, “obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained
without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in question is not
in general public use.”105 Kyllo supports the conclusion that breath tests
are searches.
In United States v. Jones,106 the Court returned to the question of
what constitutes a “search.” In Jones, “agents installed a GPS tracking
device on the undercarriage of the Jeep while it was parked in a public
parking lot” and then “used the device to track the vehicle’s movements.”107 Justice Scalia wrote for the majority and explained that the
Government “physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information.”108 As such, Justice Scalia reasoned that, “such a
physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”109 As the opinion explained, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was originally concerned with preventing the government from trespassing on private
property. Justice Harlan’s famous concurring opinion in Katz, however,
announced the theory (which the Court later adopted) that violations of a
person’s reasonable expectation of privacy violated the Fourth Amendment.110 The problem was that for some time courts ignored the older
trespass law and focused exclusively on the “reasonable expectation of
privacy” test. Jones clarified that the “reasonable-expectation-of-privacy
test augmented, but did not displace or diminish, the common-law
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trespassory test that preceded it.”111 Thus, in Jones the government argued that placing the GPS device on the vehicle was not a search as the
search did not violate Jones’ privacy.112 The Court rejected this argument,
holding that when there is a trespass, then the expectation of privacy is
irrelevant.113 Furthermore, the Court held that when the government
commits a trespass against a person’s property in order to obtain information, the government violates the Fourth Amendment.114 Jones provides
the bright-line rule: when government agents physically touch a person’s
property, then a search occurs under the Fourth Amendment.
Under Jones, police officer’s actions without a warrant are limited to
what “any private citizen might do.”115 Inserting a tube into a suspect’s
mouth requires the police to physically touch the suspect. Without consent, this touching is a physical trespass or a battery at common law. It
goes beyond what any private citizen might do. Under the principles set
forth in Jones, regardless of whether a suspect has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his breath, a breath test is a search because it would be
a battery at common law. Thus, under existing Supreme Court precedent,
breath tests are searches.
C. Do Implied Consent Statutes Constitute a Waiver of the Right to
Object to Warrantless Search?
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111. Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (explaining that the four
Justices concurring in the outcome would have reached the same result based on the
view that the government violated Jones’s reasonable expectation of privacy).
112. See id. at 950.
113. See id. at 949–50.
114. Cf. id. at 949.
115. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1416 (2013) (stating that “a police officer
not armed with a warrant may approach a home and knock, precisely because that is
‘no more than any private citizen might do.’ ” (quoting Kentucky v. King, 131 S.Ct.
1849, 1862 (2011))).
116. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.031(a) (2012) (“A person who operates or drives
a motor vehicle in this state . . . shall be considered to have given consent to a chemi-
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Although government-compelled breath tests are searches for
Fourth Amendment purposes, the state or federal government does not
violate the Fourth Amendment if the searched person consents to the
search. Sometimes courts consider consent an exception to the warrant
requirement. More commonly, the court expresses the rule that the
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit searches based on consent.
As Justice Sotomayor noted in McNeely, every state has an implied
consent statute. One possible way to address breath testing is that drivers
have waived their right to object to warrantless searches of their breath
by voluntary consenting to drive within a state’s jurisdiction.116 This
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cal test or tests of the person’s breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic
content.”). This statute appears typical. See, e.g., NMSA 1978, § 66-8-107 (stating
“[a]ny person who operates a motor vehicle within this state shall be deemed to have
given consent . . . to chemical tests of his breath or blood or both . . . .”).
117. See Burnett v. Anchorage, 806 F.2d 1447, 1448–49 (9th Cir. 1986).
118. See id. at 1451.
119. See id. at 1449–50; this was a significant change from the ruling of the district
court, see generally Burnett v. Anchorage, 634 F. Supp. 1029 (D. Alaska 1986) (explaining that the district court apparently believed that consent could justify the
search).
120. State v. Wiseman, 816 N.W.2d 689, 694 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012) (emphasis
original).
121. E.g., Commonwealth v. Kohl, 615 A.2d 308, 313 (Pa. 1992); see McDuff v.
State, 763 So.2d 850, 856 (Miss. 2000).
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presents the basic question of whether a state may require a person to
submit to a chemical test that she would normally have a right to refuse in
the absence of a warrant as a condition of obtaining a license. Courts that
have addressed this issue have almost uniformly held that a state may not
bypass the Fourth Amendment in this way.
In 1986, the Ninth Circuit addressed a challenge to Alaska’s Implied
Consent statute by three defendants who had refused to submit to a
breathalyzer test, arguing that they had no obligation to do so.117 The
Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court’s conviction of the three appellants
for refusing to provide a breath sample, explaining that, under the Fourth
Amendment, a breath test is a search.118 As such, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that a breath test is subject to the Fourth Amendment’s requirements that the search be reasonable and that, unless an exception applies,
the government must obtain a warrant before conducting such a search.
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit held that the breath test was constitutional
because the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement applied, not because the defendant supposedly consented to the
search.119
Courts across the country have generally held that breath tests are
justified under the exigent circumstances exception, not consent. As the
Minnesota Court of Appeals explained in 2012: “[T]he statutory phrase
‘implied consent’ is a misnomer . . . When the requirements of probable
cause and exigent circumstances are met, consent is not constitutionally
necessary to administer a warrantless chemical test, nor is consent the
basis for the search.”120 More than one State Supreme Court, rather than
reading in an exception based on exigent circumstances, has held that
“implied consent” laws violate the Fourth Amendment.121
Scholars have written numerous articles on so-called implied consent statutes, pointing out that courts have upheld searches under these
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statutes based on other valid exceptions to the warrant requirement.122
Accordingly, there is no need for this article to rehash these well-known
arguments. The point worth making, however, is that courts have upheld
warrantless searches, not based on consent, but based on the idea that the
searches fall within an exception to the warrant requirement—typically
the exigent circumstances exception. Therefore, it is unlikely the Supreme
Court would find that the warrantless searches of breath are constitutional based on a driver’s implied consent to such a search.
D. Is Breath Testing Distinguishable from Blood Testing?
Because breath testing is a search, the next question is whether the
government can justify it under the Fourth Amendment. As noted above,
the Court has typically applied the same analysis used in McNeely, asking
whether the warrantless search of one’s breath is constitutional under one
of the specifically enumerated exceptions. Breath testing could fall under
one of two exceptions: the exigent circumstances exception or the search
incident to arrest exception.123
1. Exigent Circumstances
State and federal courts across the country have routinely held that
breath testing is permitted under the exigent circumstances exception.
These cases usually cite Schmerber and Skinner. In State v. Blank,124 the
Alaska Supreme Court drew on earlier case law involving blood testing
and articulated that blood and breath testing have identical constitutional
requirements.125 For example, the court heavily relied on Layland v.
State,126 a case that held that blood testing was constitutional if it fell
under the exigent circumstances exception.127 In State v. Taylor,128 the

02/06/2014 10:11:19
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122. See B. Bernard Zaleha, Alaska’s Criminalization of Refusal to Take a Breath
Test: Is it a Permissible Warrantless Search Under the Fourth Amendment, 5 ALASKA
L. REV. 263, 291–92 (1988); Penn Lerblance, Implied Consent to Intoxication Tests: A
Flawed Concept, 53 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 39 (1978).
123. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989) (explaining that the only other potential exception is the special needs exception, but the
“special needs” exception cannot be primarily about gathering evidence to use in a
criminal proceeding; thus, it is not applicable in drunk driving cases); see, e.g., Spencer
v. City of Bay City, 292 F.Supp.2d 932, 946 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (ruling that special
needs exception did not permit warrantless breath tests of criminal suspects).
124. 90 P.3d 156 (Alaska 2004).
125. Id. at 162.
126. 535 P.2d 1043 (Alaska 1975).
127. Id. at 1046 (stating blood testing is permissible under the exigent circumstances exception to warrantless searches).
128. 531 A.2d 157 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987).
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129. Id. at 160–61.
130. 70 S.W.3d 752 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).
131. Id. at 760–61.
132. Commonwealth v. Anderl, 477 A.2d 1356, 1364 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (internal
citations omitted).
133. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1566.
134. See, e.g., Patrick v. State, 750 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Ark. 1988); Guerre-Chaley v.
State, 88 P.3d 539, 544 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004); State v. Faust, 682 N.W.2d 371, 374 n.
2 (Wis. 2004).
135. See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 481–82 (1984) (describing the quality control procedures used in evidentiary breath testing machines).
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Connecticut Court of Appeals held that exigent circumstance existed because of the rapid dissipation of alcohol from one’s bloodstream.129 Similarly, in State v. Humphreys,130 the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals
held that “[b]ased upon the fact that evidence of blood alcohol content
begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, a compulsory breath or
blood test, taken with or without the consent of the donor, falls within the
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.”131 Furthermore, in Commonwealth v. Anderl, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
held that “the warrantless seizure of the appellant’s alcohol-laden breath
is valid either as a search incident to arrest . . . or a search necessitated by
exigent circumstances; i.e., the evanescent nature of the alcohol in . . .
[defendant’s] bloodstream.”132
Courts across the country have held that breath tests are searches
and that law enforcement officers can compel individuals to take breath
tests as long as the tests fall under the exigent circumstances exception.
Therefore, the question is whether the state must prove that there was no
time to obtain a warrant prior to forcing a suspect to submit to a warrantless breath test when the state invokes the exigent circumstances exception. McNeely unambiguously answers that the state must make such a
showing. In McNeely, eight justices agreed that the exigent circumstances
exception requires the state to show that there was no time to secure a
warrant.133 But are there differences between blood and breath testing
which make the need for breath tests more pressing? Let us examine the
typical breath testing procedure.
Although police frequently carry portable breath test units, the
readings from these portable units are not sufficiently accurate for use in
criminal prosecutions.134 Rather, in criminal prosecutions, the state uses a
larger breath-testing device, which law enforcement personnel regularly
calibrate and typically keep at police stations.135 Thus, when police officers arrest a suspect, they must transport the suspect to a police station,
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136. State v. McNeely, No. ED 96402, 2011 WL 2455571, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. June
21, 2011) (detailing transportation following McNeely’s arrest).
137. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 60.040(a) (1989) (“The following procedure
must be used to obtain and analyze a breath sample on a breath test instrument: (1)
observe the person to be tested for at least 15 minutes immediately before testing, to
ensure that the person does not regurgitate or place anything in his or her mouth
during that period”).
138. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1565.
139. California v. Avecedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
140. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989).
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which could be miles away.136 In many ways, breath testing is more complicated than blood testing. As the Court noted in Skinner, accurate testing depends on testing alveolar (or “deep-lung”) breath. Therefore, an
accurate test requires that someone observe the subject for at least fifteen
minutes prior to the test to ensure there is no regurgitation of alcohol into
the mouth that could affect the test.137 Thus, even if police pulled a suspect over in front of a police station the breath test could not take place
for at least fifteen minutes. There is no observation period for blood testing, meaning that breath testing inherently takes longer than blood testing. Therefore, it is even more unlikely that the Court would say that
there is no time to obtain a warrant as a matter of law or fact. Courts
would still need to conduct this analysis on a case-by-case basis because
individual circumstances might affect whether it is reasonable to obtain a
warrant before conducting a breathalyzer test.
Courts have also held that breath testing is less intrusive than blood
testing. But given the analysis of the exigent circumstances exception in
McNeely, the level of intrusiveness does not appear to matter. McNeely
clarified that there is a bright-line rule when the state invokes the exigent
circumstances exception: the state must show there was no time to obtain
a warrant.138 Nonetheless, could a lower court ignore the bright-line rule
and apply a more general reasonableness test, balancing the intrusiveness
of the search with the state’s interest in the search? The strongest argument a lower court could make for getting around the apparent brightline rule stems from Justice Scalia’s complaint that Supreme Court “jurisprudence lurched back and forth between imposing a categorical warrant
requirement and looking to reasonableness alone.”139 After all, in Skinner, the Supreme Court already stated that breath tests were a minor intrusion.140 Moreover the state interest in drunk driving is vastly more
important than the state interest in regulating railroad employees. In
Skinner, the Court noted that in nine years there had been a grand total
of 100 people killed or injured in train accidents due to alcohol or drug
consumption—about 10 casualties each year. This cannot begin to com-
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141. Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013).
142. Id. at 1980.
143. Id. at 1977.
144. Id. at 1972 (“Like a fingerprint, the 13 CODIS loci are not themselves evidence of any particular crime, in the way that a drug test can by itself be evidence of
illegal narcotics use. A DNA profile is useful to the police because it gives them a
form of identification to search the records already in their valid possession.”); see
also id. at 1983 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (distinguishing DNA collection for identification
purposes from DNA collection for evidentiary purposes) (“It is only when a governmental purpose aside from crime-solving is at stake that we engage in the free-form
‘reasonableness’ inquiry that the Court indulges at length today.”).
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pare to the thousands of deaths and injuries due to drunk driving each
year. The question of whether the need to obtain a warrant for breath
testing would interfere with the enforcement of drunk-driving laws would
still exist. If a court were merely to balance the “minor intrusion” of
breath tests with the state interest in trying to limit drunk driving, the
state interest would prevail.
Moreover, the Court in Maryland v. King applied a generalized reasonableness test to uphold a swab of a suspect’s mouth to obtain a DNA
sample.141 King acknowledged that any intrusion beyond the surface of
the body was constitutionally significant, but the Court ultimately held
that the state interest outweighed a person’s privacy interest in their
DNA.142 At first glance, King appears to support a generalized reasonableness approach to breath testing; however, the King decision relied on
the central premise that law enforcement officers did not take DNA samples to collect evidence but used them in the identification of suspects.143
In fact, the majority decision explicitly distinguished DNA sampling from
“a drug test” designed to gather evidence of a particular crime.144 The
King approach is inapplicable here because breath or blood samples are
intended to seize evidence of a particular crime and are easily distinguishable from DNA samples used for identification purposes.
Accordingly, for a court to use a generalized balancing test approach (such as the Court used in King) a court would have to simply
ignore the clear mandate of McNeely, which seems to require applying
the per se rule to searches for evidence of intoxication beneath the surface of the body. Perhaps one day the Supreme Court will reverse or limit
its holding in McNeely and somehow exempt breath tests; until that day,
the lower courts have to apply the per se rule set forth in McNeely.
As Chief Justice Roberts discussed, Supreme Court precedent dictates that the existence of exigent circumstances is one exception to the
warrant requirement. Chief Justice Roberts also explained that the “exception applies when there is a compelling need to prevent the imminent
destruction of important evidence, and there is no time to obtain a war-
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rant.”145 Accordingly, if the state attempts to introduce a warrantless
breath test into evidence and invokes the search incident to arrest exception then the state will need to prove that there was insufficient time to
obtain a warrant before important evidence would be lost.
2. Search Incident to Arrest
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145. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1569 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
146. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769–70 (1966).
147. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
148. Id. at 754.
149. Id. at 763.
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The exigent circumstances exception is not the only exception that
might apply to justify breath tests. Another potential exception is the
search incident to arrest exception, which a few courts have used to permit warrantless blood or breath searches. As noted above, I think one
must read McNeely to implicitly prohibit blood draws under this exception; however, because this is an implicit prohibition it is necessary to
look at the exception more closely. The Supreme Court has held that the
search incident to arrest exception does not extend to searches inside a
suspect’s body and such searches must be relatively contemporaneous in
time and place with the arrest. Either of these limitations makes blood
and breath testing impermissible.
We already saw that Schmerber explicitly stated that the search incident to arrest exception did not extend to searches beyond the body’s
surface.146 The modern constitutional doctrine of search incident to arrest
is rooted in Chimel v. California,147 which the Court decided three years
after Schmerber. In Chimel, police obtained an arrest warrant, went to
Chimel’s home, arrested him in the living room and “the officers then
looked through the entire three-bedroom house, including the attic, the
garage, and a small workshop” calling this a search incident to arrest.148 In
explaining the proper limits to a search incident to arrest, Chimel stated
the basic principle that “it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search
the person arrested in order to remove any weapons . . . [and] for the
arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s
person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.”149 The Supreme Court also explained the search incident to arrest exception, noting that the Chimel Court recognized “that the scope of a warrantless
search must be commensurate with the rationale that excepts the search
from the warrant requirement. Thus, a warrantless search incident to arrest . . . must be limited to the area ‘into which an arrestee might
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reach.’”150 Furthermore, in Robinson, the Court explained that “[t]he justification or reason for the authority to search incident to a lawful arrest
rests quite as much on the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him
into custody as it does on the need to preserve evidence on his person.”151
Although these decisions did not explicitly examine searches inside
of a suspect’s body, they are consistent with Schmerber’s comment on the
limits of searches incident to arrest. First, we do not normally consider a
substance in a person’s blood stream to be “in his possession.” For example, if a person consumes marijuana in a country where it is legal and then
flies to the United States, the person may have chemicals in his blood
stream, but we do not regard this as in his possession.152 More importantly, however, the suspect in custody has no ability to “destroy” the
evidence.153 A suspect cannot “reach” into his blood stream or lungs to
remove alcohol.
In Illinois v. Lafayette,154 the Court also stated that the purpose of
the search incident to arrest exception placed limits on the search of the
person, noting: “the interests supporting a search incident to arrest would
hardly justify disrobing an arrestee on the street, but the practical necessities of routine jail administration may even justify taking a prisoner’s
clothes before confining him, although that step would be rare.”155 Lower
courts have also widely held that the search incident to arrest exception
does not justify strip searches, cavity searches, and other types of searches
that invade an arrestee’s body.156
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150. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (2000) (internal citations and footnotes
omitted) (“[W]e do not hold that a full Chimel search would have been justified in
this case without a formal arrest and without a warrant.”).
151. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973).
152. State v. Thronsen, 809 P.2d 941, 943 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (“All of the cases
we have reviewed support the conclusion that a defendant cannot be convicted for
possession of cocaine in his or her body. These cases conclude that a person who has
cocaine in his or her body has no control over the cocaine and therefore does not
have possession.”).
153. One possibility is that a suspect could vomit and thus purge the stomach of
alcohol to prevent one’s blood alcohol level from rising; however, whether we could
consider this destruction of evidence is doubtful, in part because alcohol in the stomach, which has not yet been digested, does not affect a suspect’s sobriety level.
154. 462 U.S. 640 (1983).
155. Id. at 645. The Court held that a different exception to the warrant requirement applied once the suspect arrived at the station and his or her belongings needed
to be administratively inventoried—“the inventory search.” Id. at 646.
156. See, e.g., Gallagher v. United States, 406 F.2d 102, 107 n.3 (8th Cir. 1969)
(“lawful arrest will support a properly limited incidental search”); Giles v. Ackerman,
746 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[I]ntrusions into the arrestee’s body, including
body cavity searches as authorized by the County’s policy, are not authorized by ar-
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Arizona v. Gant157 is the most important recent Supreme Court case
on searches incident to arrest. In Gant, police arrested the suspect for a
traffic offense, “handcuffed, and locked [the suspect] in the back of a
patrol car [while] police officers searched his car and discovered cocaine
in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat.”158 At trial, the government
sought to introduce this evidence, claiming police obtained it during a
valid search incident to arrest.159 The Court held that where evidence is
not at risk of destruction the search incident to arrest exception does not
apply.160 The Court cited Chimel for the proposition that “a search incident to arrest may only include ‘the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within
his immediate control’ . . . [that is,] the area from within which he might
gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”161 Additionally,
the Court discussed how that limitation defined the boundaries of the
search incident to arrest exception.162 Finally, the Court dictated that: “if
there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law
enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not apply.”163 Gant
dictates that arrest justifies a search of the person. A breath test is a
search of the person. Nonetheless, Gant also indicates that the search of
the person and the area under his control is limited to the dual “purposes
of protecting arresting officers and safeguarding any evidence of the offense of arrest that an arrestee might conceal or destroy.”164 A suspect is
unable to reach into his lungs or blood stream to remove alcohol and
destroy evidence, making it unlikely that the search incident to arrest exception would apply to breath tests.
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rest alone.”); Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 393, 395–96 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that
arrest alone does not permit police to conduct a “strip search,” which is generally not
allowed prior to booking); People v. More, 97 N.Y.2d 209 (2002) (holding that search
incident to arrest does not alone justify body cavity searches); Smith v. State, 557
S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (“A search for blood cannot be based on the
incident to a lawful arrest exception.”); Moss v. Commonwealth, 516 S.E.2d 246, 250
(Va. App. 1999) (“Even if there was a ‘clear indication’ that contraband was located
in Moss’ body, there were no exigencies present in this case justifying a warrantless
search. Nothing in the record suggests that Moss had a concealed weapon, nor was
there a risk of destruction of evidence.”).
157. 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
158. Id. at 336.
159. Id. at 337.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 339 (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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165. Id. at 350.
166. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
167. Justice Scalia quoted a law review article that found “nearly 20 such exceptions, including ‘searches incident to arrest . . . automobile searches . . . border
searches . . . administrative searches of regulated businesses . . . exigent circumstances
. . . search[es] incident to nonarrest when there is probable cause to arrest . . . boat
boarding for document checks . . . welfare searches . . . inventory searches . . . airport
searches . . . school search[es]. . . .’ ” Id. at 582 (quoting Bradley, Two Models of the
Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1473–74 (1985)). “Since then,” Scalia
added, “we have added at least two more.” Id.
168. For example, in New York City between 2004 and 2009 there were 2.8 million
Terry stops by local police. Floyd v. City of New York, 283 F.R.D. 153, 159 (S.D.N.Y.
2012).
169. See also Justice Scalia’s scathing dissent in Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. 1958,
1980 (arguing that the warrant requirement has been severely eroded.)
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Gant appears to have much in common with McNeely. The Court
has repeatedly stated that courts should narrowly construe exceptions to
the warrant requirement. In Gant, the State proposed a “broad reading
of” the search incident to arrest exception, which the Court called “unfounded.”165 In both Gant and McNeely, members of the Court were disturbed that courts and officers stretched the exceptions to the warrant
requirement well beyond the justifications that created them. Thus, the
Court felt that it needed to draw a line.
Indeed, in 1991, Justice Scalia noted in his concurring opinion in
California v. Acevedo166 that “[e]ven before today’s decision, the ‘warrant
requirement’ had become so riddled with exceptions that it was basically
unrecognizable.”167 Thus, I think we see a common concern in many of
these recent search and seizure cases: the vast majority of searches occur
under exceptions to the warrant requirement. In the United States each
year, there are tens of millions of special needs searches, Terry searches,
exigent circumstances searches, searches incident to arrest and automobile exception searches.168 In contrast, there are relatively few warrants.
Justice Scalia, at least, seems concerned that the exceptions have swallowed the rule.169
The Gant Court was concerned that the search incident to arrest
exception was overused. If this analysis is correct, the Court is sticking to
a narrow interpretation of search incident to arrest. Therefore, it is hard
to imagine that the Court would be willing to permit the stretching of the
search incident to arrest exception to permit searches inside an arrestee’s
body.
There is also a more general reason to think that the search incident
to arrest exception does not apply to blood or breath testing. All of the
exceptions to the warrant requirement are premised on the idea that a
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warrant is impractical in certain circumstances. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly noted: “Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police. This
was done . . . so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade
[the citizen’s] privacy in order to enforce the law.”170 In Terry v. Ohio,171
the Court explained that “the police must, whenever practicable, obtain
advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant
procedure, [and] in most instances, failure to comply with the warrant
requirement can only be excused by exigent circumstances.”172 In his concurring opinion in McNeely, Chief Justice Roberts quoted this proposition from Terry and further explained that “[r]equiring police to apply for
a warrant if practicable increases the likelihood that a neutral, detached
judicial officer will review the case, helping to ensure that there is probable cause for any search and that any search is reasonable.”173 This indicates the Court’s preference that when police have time to obtain a
warrant they should do so. Accordingly, if police could easily obtain a
warrant in the one-hour period in which they cannot conduct a breath
test it is hard to see how any exception could apply.
Finally, there is yet another potential problem in applying the search
incident to arrest exception to breath searches. The case law discussing
this exception holds that it is only applicable if the search is conducted
“contemporaneous” to the time and place of the arrest.174 In Preston v.
United States,175 the Court explained that the justifications for the search
incident to arrest exception “are absent where a search is remote in time
or place from the arrest.”176 Similarly, in United States v. Chadwick,177 the
Supreme Court quoted Preston’s exact language.178 The Ninth Circuit has
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170. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 560 (2004) (quoting McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948)).
171. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
172. Id. at 20 (internal citations omitted).
173. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1573 (2013) (Roberts, C.J. concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
174. United States v. Ventresca (1965) 380 U.S. 102, 107, n.2 (1965) (“The rule
allowing contemporaneous searches (incident to arrest) is justified, for example, by
the need to seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault an officer
or effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of
the crime—things which might easily happen where the weapon or evidence is on the
accused’s person or under his immediate control.”).
175. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
176. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964); see also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764 (1969) (quoting Preston, 376 U.S. at 367).
177. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
178. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15; see also Commonwealth v. Pierre,
893 N.E.2d 378, 384 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (“The case law interpreting the Fourth
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also made this same observation.179 The Massachusetts Court of Appeals
surveyed the case law and concluded that: “[t]he Federal Circuit cases . . .
do purport to allow a ‘reasonable’ delay between an arrest and an otherwise permissible search, but in each instance the delay at issue was no
more than a few minutes and the search was at the scene of the arrest.”180
Although the precise amount of time that might constitute a reasonable
delay is debatable, it is doubtful that a search of a suspect’s breath conducted an hour later and miles away from the place of the arrest would
constitute a reasonable delay. This is especially true if police had time to
obtain a warrant in the interim. Thus, the government generally cannot
use the search incident to arrest exception to justify a search officers conducted after transporting an arrestee to another location.181
With respect to breath and blood searches in drunk-driving cases, a
few courts have explicitly rejected the search incident to arrest exception.182 The Missouri Supreme Court did so in McNeely. Additionally, after analyzing Schmerber, the Maine Supreme Court concluded that the
Supreme Court did not “sanction an involuntary blood test based on the
doctrine of search incident to arrest.”183 Furthermore, in United States v.
Berry,184 the Sixth Circuit explicitly rejected the search incident to arrest
exception in drunk driving cases, stating: “[t]he rationale for a search incident to arrest exception does not directly support the taking of a blood
test without the suspect’s consent.”185
Most other courts have implicitly held that the search incident to
arrest exception does not justify blood or breath tests. For example, in
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Amendment demonstrates, however, that the contemporaneity requirement continues to have meaning. Accordingly, this case, where the search did not occur at the
time or at the place of arrest, has surely crossed that line.”).
179. U.S. v. Tarazon, 989 F.2d 1045, 1051 (citing United States v. Turner, 926 F.2d
883, 887–88 (9th Cir. 1991)) (noting that the search incident to arrest exception applies “to situations in which only a short delay occurs and where the arrestee is not far
removed from the area searched”).
180. Commonwealth v. Pierre, 893 N.E.2d 378, 383 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (internal
citations omitted).
181. See People v. Ingham, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that
when a suspect was arrested with her purse and police failed to search the purse at the
time of arrest, police cannot later search the purse without first obtaining a warrant).
182. One court has allowed a warrantless breath test under the search incident to
arrest exception. In Commonwealth v. Anderl, 477 A.2d 1356, 1364 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1984), the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that breath tests were admissible under
both the exigent circumstances and the search incident to arrest exceptions, without
providing its reasoning.
183. State v. Baker, 502 A.2d 489, 492 (Me. 1985).
184. 866 F.2d 887 (6th Cir. 1989).
185. Id. at 891 (internal citation omitted).
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State v. Welch,186 the North Carolina Supreme Court held: “Since the
withdrawal of a blood sample is subject to [F]ourth [A]mendment requirements, a search warrant must be procured before a suspect may be
required to submit to such a procedure unless probable cause and exigent
circumstances exist that would justify a warrantless search.”187 While the
Court did not explicitly reject search incident to arrest, the comment that
the law requires a warrant unless there are exigent circumstances logically precludes any other exception. In State v. Stern,188 the New Hampshire Supreme Court implicitly held that the search incident to arrest
exception did not justify a warrantless search of blood when it explicitly
held that the exigent circumstances exception was the only exception that
could justify a blood draw in drunk driving cases.189
In drunk driving cases, a handful of courts have used the search incident to arrest exception in an attempt to follow the Schmerber reasoning,
although many of the courts that once invoked search incident to arrest in
blood or breath testing have since abandoned that exception in favor of
the exigent circumstances exception. In Burnett v. Municipality of
Anchorage,190 the Ninth Circuit heavily relied on Schmerber to invoke the
search incident to arrest exception.191 However, in United States v.
Chapel,192 the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, overruled its prior line of
cases, which had required custodial arrest as a prerequisite to warrantless
searches and had characterized Schmerber searches as searches incident
to arrest.193 Chapel re-characterized warrantless Schmerber searches as
exigent circumstances searches.194 Chapel did not explicitly say that law
enforcement officers could never use the search incident to arrest exception to support a blood test, but, since Chapel, the Ninth Circuit has gen-
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186. 342 S.E.2d 789 (N.C. 1986).
187. Id. at 793.
188. 846 A.2d 64 (N.H. 2004).
189. Id. at 68 (“To be constitutional, the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement must apply.”).
190. 806 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1986).
191. Id. at 1450 (“[T]he breath test sought by the Alaska law enforcement officials
is clearly a less objectionable intrusion than the compulsory blood samples allowed
under Schmerber. It is clear then that the breathalyzer examination in question is an
appropriate and reasonable search incident to arrest which appellants have no constitutional right to refuse.”).
192. 55 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1418–19 (“We now know from the Supreme Court’s reasoning in a case
decided after Harvey that the seizure of blood in Schmerber ‘fell within the exigentcircumstances exception to the warrant requirement.’ ”) (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470
U.S. 753, 759 (1985)).
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erally relied on exigent circumstance to justify blood tests.195 In State v.
Bohling,196 the Wisconsin Supreme Court explained that the search incident to arrest exception might justify a warrantless blood search in certain circumstances.197 Similarly, in Gregg v. State,198 the Mississippi
Supreme Court also upheld blood draws as a hybrid Schmerber search,
which they described as part incident to arrest and part exigent circumstances.199 In recent years Mississippi courts, however, have relied on exigent circumstances to justify blood searches and have not applied the
search incident to arrest exception.200 Additionally, in United States v.
Reid,201 the Fourth Circuit also held that breathalyzer searches are justifiable under either the search incident to arrest exception or exigent circumstances exception.202 Finally, in Wing v. State,203 the Alaska Court of
Appeals held that breath tests are permissible under the search incident
to arrest doctrine; however, the court based this holding on the fact that
the defendant had conceded that the exception applied and offered no
other reasoning to support its decision.204
If one reads McNeely to forbid blood draws under the search incident to arrest exception because that exception does not permit searches
beyond the external body of the suspect, then the same reasoning would
appear to apply to searches of a suspect’s breath. One could make an
argument that the breath search, unlike a blood search, does not intrude
beneath a suspect’s skin and (perhaps) does not intrude inside the suspect’s body at all. That is to say, a breathalyzer test only analyzes a sus-
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195. Nonetheless, in United States v. Edmo, 140 F.3d 1289, 1291–92 (9th Cir. 1998),
the Ninth Circuit discussed how the Schmerber Court relied on the search incident to
arrest exception.
196. 494 N.W.2d 399 (Wis. 1993).
197. Id. at 400. Later Wisconsin cases, however, allow blood searches under the
exigent circumstances exception, not under the search incident to arrest exception.
See, e.g., State v. Faust, 682 N.W.2d 371, 377–78 (Wis. 2004) (requiring an emergency
sufficient to justify an exigency under federal law, but continuing to require a prior
lawful arrest).
198. 374 So. 2d 1301 (Miss. 1979).
199. Id. at 1304 (“[O]ur decision here upholds the ‘intrusion’ into Gregg’s body
(extracting blood) as an incident to the officer’s lawful arrest of him and the prevailing exigencies.”).
200. See, e.g., Holloman v. State, 820 So. 2d 52, 55 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (“A warrantless search is permissible in certain exigent circumstances if it can be shown that
grounds existed to conduct the search that, had time permitted, would have reasonably satisfied a disinterested magistrate that a warrant should properly issue.”).
201. 929 F.2d 990 (4th Cir. 1991).
202. Id.
203. 268 P.3d 1105, 1110 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012).
204. Id. at 1109–10.
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pect’s breath once it has left the suspect’s body. Additionally, though the
tube goes slightly into the suspect’s mouth, the tube does not go down the
suspect’s throat. One major problem with this argument is that Skinner
appears to have already rejected it. Skinner noted this was a search, in
part because the test relies on testing deep lung, alveolar breath. Also,
the suspect must cooperate by breathing deeply and blowing into a tube
placed in her mouth. Thus, the test is about analyzing air from deep in the
lungs and is not simply a passive detection of exhalations. Of course, one
could use the same reasoning to argue that urine tests do not intrude
beneath the body’s surface because police are not collecting urine from
the bladder directly but are only collecting the urine once the suspect
expels it. As we have seen, courts are unlikely to accept such an argument
for urine. The argument is only slightly less implausible for breath.
Thus, the argument that a breath test does not examine beneath the
external surface of a suspect’s body seems dubious. The other two considerations—that a search must be contemporaneous and that police officers
had no time to obtain a warrant—are just as applicable to breath tests as
to blood tests. Therefore, it appears difficult to provide any acceptable
basis for distinguishing between blood and breath testing with respect to
search incident to arrest.205
IV. CONCLUSION
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205. One final application of McNeely is worth noting. The Court has yet to decide
whether misdemeanors which do not occur in the presence of police require a warrant
prior to arrest. See Atwater v. City of Largo Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340 n.11 (2001).
States have arrest statutes which explicitly exempt drunk driving arrests from the normal rule that misdemeanors not occurring in the presence of police require police to
obtain a warrant. The justification for this seems to be that the exigent circumstances
require immediate arrest. McNeely is directly relevant to this analysis. If elimination
of alcohol is not necessarily sufficient to justify a warrantless search, it would also not
be sufficient to justify warrantless seizure of the person.
206. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1555 (2013).
207. Id. at 1569 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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McNeely held that, “[i]n those drunk-driving investigations where
police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can
be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the
Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so.”206 As Chief Justice Roberts summarized in his concurring opinion: “Our cases establish that there
is an exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. That
exception applies when there is a compelling need to prevent the imminent destruction of important evidence, and there is no time to obtain a
warrant.”207 Only Justice Thomas dissented from this basic principle, and
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endorsed a per se exception to the warrant requirement for alcohol testing.208 This holding seriously calls into question the practice of warrantless
breathalyzer testing. If courts apply the bright-line rules the Court articulated in McNeely, it is hard to see how such warrantless searches of blood
or breath are constitutional without a showing of particularized need. Additionally, McNeely’s effective overruling of Schmerber will undoubtedly
have widespread effects on the prosecution of drunk driving cases for
years to come. One of the principle results of McNeely is that the state
will need to either establish that there was no time to apply for a warrant
before conducting a blood or breath test or the state will need to obtain a
warrant for blood, breath, and/or urine tests in all drunk driving cases.
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208. Id. at 1574–78 (Thomas J., dissenting).
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